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SAN JOSÉ STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2021
Benjamin Reed, Ph.D. Department of Computer Science
Navrati Saxena, Ph.D. Department of Computer Science
Pramod Srinivasan, M.S. Juniper Networks, Inc.
ABSTRACT
USING ORACLE TO SOLVE ZOOKEEPER ON TWO-REPLICA PROBLEMS
by Ching-Chan Lee
The project introduces an Oracle, a failure detector, in Apache ZooKeeper and makes
it fault-tolerant in a two-node system. The project demonstrates the Oracle authorizes the
primary process to maintain the liveness when the majority’s rule becomes an obstacle to
continue Apache ZooKeeper service. In addition to the property of accuracy and
completeness from Chandra et al.’s research, the project proposes the property of see to
avoid losing transactions and the property of mutual exclusion to avoid split-brain issues.
The hybrid properties render not only more sounder flexibility in the implementation but
also stronger guarantees on safety. Thus, the Oracle complements Apache ZooKeeper’s
availability.
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Fig. 1: Problem Overview - Loss of Liveness
1 INTRODUCTION
Apache ZooKeeper is fault-tolerant when the majority of the computing nodes are
healthy because the ZooKeeper Atomic Broadcast protocol, ZAB, uses the concept of
quorums. It means that it is not fault-tolerant in a two-node system because the majority
of a quorum of 2 is still 2. The project proposes using a failure detector as an Oracle in a
two-node system to solve the problem while ensuring Apache ZooKeeper’s guarantees.
Apache ZooKeeper is a distributed coordination application widely used in large-scale
distributed systems, and critical service to the whole system is often. Besides the systems
that comprise many computing nodes, deploying Apache ZooKeeper in a standalone
mode or a two-node system is not rare. However, the two-node system design often serves
as a solution to achieve high availability, e.g., active-passive pattern [2] [3], but this
design does not fit with the concept of quorums, Fig. 1. As a result, the failure of Apache
ZooKeeper likely becomes an obstacle to maintain high availability in two-node systems.
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Fig. 2: Solution Overview - The Oracle
The project is inspired by the design which allocates two identical computing nodes
into the same chassis, and there exists an external hardware device as a failure detector,
the Oracle. This hardware failure inevitably cause one of Apache ZooKeeper service to
leave the cluster, and further introduces a service interruption. However, with the
integration of the existed failure detector, the Oracle, the proposed method can eliminate
the period of the service interruption, Fig. 2. In this work, the project discloses the Oracle
requirements to solve the consensus problem with ZAB, ZooKeeper Atomic Broadcast
protocol. The project surveys the practical implementation and analysis of a failure
detector in Park’s research and others [4] [5] [6] [7]. The project reveals the properties of
completeness and accuracy from the former research regarding the failure detectors by
Chandra et al. [1] [8] [9] Also, the project proposes other two properties of see and
mutual exclusion to enhance our proposed failure detector and address two concerns,
lost transaction and split-brain. The combination of these four properties renders
sounder flexibility in practical implementation.
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This project is written in the following structure. In Section 2, it presents a literature
reviews on two topics. It starts with the relation of Apache ZooKeeper and distributed
computing, and then the failure detectors with the consensus algorithms.
In section 3, it discloses the proposed method which is using Oracle to solve
ZooKeeper on two-replica problem. In section 4, three possible deployment models are
introduced. In section 5, the section presents an evaluation of the service downtime on a
product of Juniper Networks Inc, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. In section 6 and 7, contains the
thoughts regarding the next steps on the project the conclusions. The major contributions
of the project are the following:
• Proposing the second-weakest failure detector is capable of making a two-node
system fault-tolerate with a quorum-based consensus algorithm.




2.1 ZooKeeper with Distributed Computing
2.1.1 Background
Distributed systems have been developed for more than thirty years. From the
beginning of the developments, people realized the potentiality and the robustness of this
technology.
The ultimate goal of distributed systems is using a group of machines to provide a
service that overcomes many problems that a single machine cannot conquer. However,
the basis of distributed computing is consensuses since a distributed system consists of a
number of machines. By gathering the power of each machine, distributed systems
achieve its robustness and reliability while consensuses are the key to trigger this powerful
technology. In other words, the participated machines have to agree on the next task to
process in the first place to have progress. Nevertheless, ordering the events in the system
is one of the prerequisites to develop distributed systems. Also, one of the main goals of
distributed systems is to be fault-tolerant. The systems need to overcome fail-stop failures
and possibly byzantine failures as well. Nevertheless, byzantine failures are often seemed
as a separated study due to its hardness. The literature review covers a few pieces of study
of it, but the project itself does not. Thankfully, with the efforts from the predecessors and
remarkable research, the basic problems have been solved and the people nowadays focus
on developing applications and tools based on distributed computing. Apache ZooKeeper
is one of the most widely-used and important applications.
Since Hunt et al. introduced Apache ZooKeeper to distributed systems, it has been
widely applied in many popular applications [10]. For example, Mesos is a distributed
operating system introduced by Hindman et al [11]. The success of Mesos not only
increases the efficiency of distributed systems but also provides a solution to execute
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multiple distributed applications on the same system. The key to this success is Apache
ZooKeeper.
This literature review covers the main topics of the ordering of events, achieving of
consensuses, ensuring consistency, and fault-tolerance in distributed systems. It focuses
on the methodologies for each corresponding topic as well as the relationship between the
methodologies and Apache ZooKeeper itself. The literature review addresses a few
questions: How to ordering events in distributed systems? What is the research solving
achieving consensus in distributed systems? How can achieve consistency in distributed
systems? What system architectures are fault-tolerant in distributed systems?
The rest of this literature is organized as the followings: 2.1.2 addresses the research
related to ordering occurred events and the methodology that Apache ZooKeeper applies
in ZAB, a consensus protocol introduced by Reed and Junqueira. 2.1.3 focuses on how
the consensuses are made in distributed systems. After the systems can have consensuses,
consistency among the system is covered by 2.1.4. 2.1.5 addresses the types of failures.
Lastly, the article ends with a conclusion in 2.1.6.
2.1.2 Ordering event based on ”The Happened Before Relation”
Ordering of events is the first problem that people encounter when developing
distributed systems. It is important to have a solution that knows which event happens
before another. When Lamport [12] proposed Logical Clock for ordering events as the
physical time is unreliable due to the theory of relativity, people realized that every total
ordering of events is an arbitrary partial ordering. Lamport used a relation called
“Happened Before” to define which event occurs first. In addition to that relation, Logical
Clock works like a counter that increments the values in certain rules applied and assigns
the value to each corresponding events. With these techniques, the system can obtain a
system-wide ordering of events, but this solution does not address the concurrent events
until Vector Clock was introduced by Fidge [13]. Unlike the fact that Logical Clock
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proposed by Lamport only maintains a single clock value, Vector Clocks maintain not
only its clock but also other processes’ clock by exchanging messages. In other words,
Fidge [13] implies that Lamport’s algorithm eliminates the possibility of other partial
ordering of the events. Although the ordering generated by applying Vector Clocks is
another arbitrary partial ordering, Vector Clocks provide a way to order concurrent events
by not eliminating the possibility of other partial ordering of events. In these solutions,
the idea of “happened before” relation and logical clock play an important role.
Reed [14] introduces ZAB, a broadcast protocol used by Apache ZooKeeper, to
ensure the ordering of delivering messages which also ensures the ordering of happened
events within the system. Lamport [12] implies that the happened before relation
maintains a causal effect between two events. By ensuring the causal relation in delivering
a message, ZAB achieves a total ordering. However, it does not maintain other
possibilities of partial ordering implied by Fidge [13] when concurrent events occur.
2.1.3 Consensus based on Paxos
Lamport [15] introduced Paxos which provides a solution to have a consensus among
unreliable machines while maintaining certain progress. Paxos is a complicated algorithm
to achieve consensuses and maintain progress simultaneously. There are two major
contributions to this research: Firstly, the uniqueness of each ballot held by quorums to
make agreements, which defines the priority of the ballot. The other is that it is important
that between any two quorums the members must intersect with at least one for the sake
of not only achieving consensuses but also maintaining consistency.
After Paxos is introduced, there are many literatures contributing to its development.
Howard et al. [16] developed a flexible version of Paxos which reduces the requirements
of intersection between any quorums as well as any two ballots while it sacrifices the
ability of fault-tolerance. In Active Disk Paxos introduced by Chockler and Malkhi [17],
the proposed algorithm for achieving a consensus on a value without using any critical
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section is an application of Paxos that utilizes the uniqueness of ballots. Nevertheless, in
FLP, a research paper of Fischer et al. [18], it is proven that there does not exist a protocol
that can ensure progress with a faulty machine involving the process of having consensus
in distributed systems.
In Apache ZooKeeper [10] cluster, there is a machine called leader machine which is
responsible for executing the requests from the clients and coordinating other machines.
The way that Apache ZooKeeper generates the leader is based on quorums from Paxos
and its applications.
2.1.4 Consistency
In the distributed systems, the tasks and the data are handled distributively for better
performance as well as higher availability. Having consistency in the system regardless of
the aspect of data or states is critical. The aforementioned concepts of ordering of events
and consensus are inseparable from achieving consistency.
When it comes to consistency in distributed system, the concept of state machines
cannot be overemphasized. The definition of state machine is addressed in Lamport’s
paper when introducing logical clock [12]. The paper addresses the definition of a state
machine as follows: A state machine consists of a set of states, a set of commands, and a
function that executes the given command which triggers a changing from the initial state
to a new state.
An important note of state machines is determinism. In Logical Clock, Lamport [12]
implies that the purpose of achieving totally ordering of events is to make sure that every
machine in the system executes the given commands in the same arbitrary order, and
every machine is synchronized because of the determinism of each operational machine.
The applications of state machines take an important role in many literatures related
to distributed systems. In Viewstamped Replication [19], the system built upon the
proposed theory is an application of state machines. In the paper, there is a leader
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machine that is responsible for handling the requests from clients, and then it propagates
the required commands to other servers. Since other machines execute the commands in
the same predefined order, the results of each machine are going to be the same. On the
other hand, besides the direct usage of state machines, using the concept of state
machines to prove the proposed theorem is another kind of application. In FLP [18], the
author uses state machines to prove the theorem that there does not exist a protocol that
can always achieve consensuses and progress with at least a faulty machine.
However, although the concept of state machines is widely adopted by many pieces of
research as either the fundamental prerequisites of the proposed
algorithms [10] [14] [19] [20] [21] or a tool to prove the proposed theorem [18], there are
a few issues to discuss in the research community. Schneider [20] proposes a distributed
system architecture to overcome failures by using the concept of state machines as well,
but he also points out that the drawback of state machines. Thus, when the operations of
the given task are not independent of the previous operation, executing this task cannot
ensure that the state machine is deterministic. Once the system loses the determinism, the
system cannot ensure consistency anymore. On the other hand, Budhiraja et al. [22], using
the proposed architecture, primary backup, can solve the aforementioned problem. In this
architecture, only one machine interacts with the clients; therefore, there does not exist
the problem of synchronization; thus, although the task will cause the machine to execute
in a non-deterministic manner, it does not affect the system.
The consistency of data is ensuring every request from the clients get the latest data.
Besides the application of state machines that achieve consistency in data, there is other
research regarding achieving consistency in data without applying the concept of state
machines. Attiya, Bar-Noy, and Dolev [23] proposed an algorithm that can implement a
shared-memory system in a message-passing system. With the proposed algorithm, the
data in a distributed system can be treated like a single machine. The algorithm is based
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on the agreement of the majority of the participated machines. It ensures that a later read
operation issued by the client will not receive a value that is older than a previous read
operation. Therefore, the read values are up to date and consistent among the system.
Moreover, Active Disk Paxos [17] addresses the same guarantee that a new read operation
would not get a value that is older than the one that a previous read operation got in
another earlier time. The method proposed combines the concept of Paxos [15] and
Logical Clock [12]. It utilizes the rank register which has the uniqueness of the ballots in
Paxos as well as the timestamp-likeness in Logical Clock. The rank register provides not
only the aforementioned guarantee but also the property of wait-free.
Another way to achieve consistency is by limiting the number of machines that are
responsible for handling requests from clients. There are several pieces of research
regarding this approach. Budhiraja [22] introduces the primary backup system achieving
consistency in data and states by building a system that only the primary machine handles
the requests from the client and then broadcasts the change to the backup machines. Since
there is only a machine to handle the request, the consistency is easy to achieve. In
contrast to a single machine handling the requests, Renesse [21] proposes the chain
replication which features the fact that there are two machines serve the client requests in
the system. The system propagates the updates in the manner of one machine by one
machine like a chain. This architecture defines the role of each machine. The first
machine in the chain is called the head which is responsible for receiving the requests
related to changing values and executing the operations. The last machine in the chain is
called the tail which is responsible for replying to the requests related to retrieving values
from the clients. As for the other machines, they serve as backups.
The approach that Apache ZooKeeper keep its consistency is an application of state
machines. The mechanism shares the same concept that is used by Budhiraja [22] in the
proposed system. Additionally, other replicas also handle the requests from clients in the
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manner which [21] applies, despite there is a leader machine in Apache ZooKeeper. The
other replicas will forward the requests to the leader machine and reply to the client with
the location of the leader. It is clear that Apache ZooKeeper takes a hybrid method
combining [24] and [21].
2.1.5 Fault-Tolerance
Budhiraja [22] explicitly indicates there are two major kinds of failures that occur in
distributed systems: fail-stop failures and byzantine failures. The requirements for
overcoming each combination of failures are different. Besides the failures of the
machines themselves, network failure, for example the network-partitioned, are also
addressed by Budhiraja [22]. Although Budhiraja’s research provides the solution to
overcome possible failures with ensuring consistency in the system, and so do other
literature [15] [16] [19] [20] [24] [23] [21]. Gilbert et al [25] proves that there does not
exist a system that can achieve consistency, availability, and partition-tolerance at the
same time and without compromising any of them.
fail-stop failure is addressed in many proposed
architecture [15] [16] [19] [20] [24] [23] [21] and it also serves as a motivation behind
these research group. In [20], this kind of failure is explicitly defined. This failure means
once the machine becomes faulty, it will automatically stop. Thus, the faulty machines
will not continue to participate in the service.
In the literature relating to achieving consensuses in distributed systems, many
researchers assume the environment consists of unreliable machines. In [15], the proposed
algorithm is designed to overcome this failure by using quorums and ballots. Moreover,
the requirements of intersections between quorums and ballots are the key to solve this
problem and guarantee progress. In [16], the flexible version of Paxos makes a trade-off
between flexibility and fault-tolerance. It focuses on which machine fails instead of the
number of faulty machines.
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Not only the aforementioned works of literatures address this issue, but they also
relate to the consistency. In [22], Budhiraja et al. provides many examples to show that
the proposed system tolerates different types and numbers of failure models without
losing its consistency. For instance, the author points out what the exactly minimum
number of machines in the system is to overcome not only fail-stop failures as well as the
issues of network partitioned.
The literature below addresses this kind of failures by focusing on the actions needed
to perform when a specific machine becoming faulty. In [19], besides the concept of state
machine, the research focuses on the actions between each machines when there is a
faulty machine. In the proposed system, there is a leader machine acts likes the one in
Primary Backup [24]. When the leader becomes faulty, the new leader will be generated
from the remained machines and it will perform an action called “View Changed.” This
action makes the system recovery from a faulty machine and the service can be provided.
In [20], the purpose of having replicas of machines is for the availability of the system.
By using the concept of state machine, the system keeps the consistency among the
replicas. When the leader machine becomes faulty, a new leader machine will be elected
from the remains replicas. Chain replication [21] deals with fail-stop over in the way of
combining [19] and [20]. The algorithm keeps propagating states in the chain. When one
of the machine becomes faulty and the latest state cannot propagate to the tail, the head
and other machines will resent the state. In cases of head and tail become faulty, the
system acts like primary backup, there will be a new head to replace the faulty one as
well as a new tail to replace the faulty tail if needed.
On the other hand, ABD [23] addresses the fail-stop failures in a different manner that
is focusing on the number of faulty machines. ABD provides an algorithm to keep the
consistency of data although the minority of the machines becomes faulty. The reason is
because the decided value is based on the majority of the machines. When every time the
11
client makes a request for changing the value, the algorithm makes sure that the new
value is known by the majority of the machines. In this case, although some machines
become faulty and do not receive the new value, they would not affect the system.
Byzantine failure is harder to deal with compared to fail-stop failure because when a
faulty machine that is byzantine failure, it means the machine is faulty but it is not aware
of this fact. In other words, the machine would keep operating and be likely to produce
incorrect data. Compared to the number of literature dealing with fail-stop failures, there
are relatively a few pieces focusing on Byzantine failure. In replicate state machine [20],
the solution to overcome this failure in distributed system is use the majority of non-faulty
machines. As long as the majority of the machines work properly like the way that
ABD [23] does, the system guarantees the consistency of the state and the data. Although
the aforementioned research makes the system capable of recovering system from this
kind of failures, they do not cover the problem of security. Gilbert et al. [25] propose
another system architecture to address the issue of security. It separates the system as
three groups of machines, the agreement cluster based on Paxos [15], the execution cluster,
and the firewall cluster. Conclusively, this design improves the ability of fault-tolerance of
the system while the firewall cluster is the key to overcome byzantine failures.
The approaches in [15] [16] [19] [20] [24] [23] [21] will not work since these are
designed based on the concept of replacement the faulty machine when failures occur.
However, it goes without saying that in order to replace a faulty machine, the system must
know the machine is faulty in the first place, which is explicitly contradicting the
definition of byzantine failures.
The ability of fault-tolerance in Apache ZooKeeper can only ensure the system
overcomes fail-stop failures. They are addressed by using the method in Primary
Backup [24] and the concept of the majority. Regarding byzantine failures, unfortunately,
there does not exist a validation mechanism in Apache ZooKeeper to possibly identify
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faulty machines when the faulty machines are the majority. That is being said that Apache
ZooKeeper recognize the correctness based on the majority of machines, but it cannot
know if the majority is actually faulty since the byzantine faulty machines are faulty but
being up based on the definition given in [26]. Also, the limitation of fault-tolerance is
number of machines consisting Apache ZooKeeper. Currently, Apache ZooKeeper follows
the limitations of the majority rule.
2.1.6 Conclusion
This literature review covers the remarkable works in distributed systems and explores
the relations with Apache ZooKeeper. The concept of “happened before” [12] plays an
important role in the development of distributed system given that it is the prerequisite of
utilizing state machines and is the fundamental assumption in [10] [14] [18] [19] [20] [21].
Also, the introduction of Paxos [15] renders a fundamental concept of having consensuses
in a group of unreliable machines with the fact that its applications [14], [16], and [17], to
name a few. The core of Apache ZooKeeper, ZAB broadcast protocol [14], combines the
methodology of Lamport [12] [15] and other predecessors’ remarkable works [19] to
ensure the consistency of the system. The high availability of Apache ZooKeeper is
achieved by a hybrid method consisted of primary backup [24] and chain replication [21].
The concept of majority [23] is utilized in Apache ZooKeeper for overcoming fail-stop
failures, but it also becomes a limitation to Apache ZooKeeper regarding the minimum
numbers to host Apache ZooKeeper service.
2.2 Solve Consensus with Failure Detectors
2.2.1 The begin of failure detectors
The study of using failure detectors to solve consensus problems systematically
started before Paxos is widely reviewed to our best knowledge. As FLP [18] brings the
problem of achieving consensus in an asynchronous distributed system with at least a
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single failure. Many start looking for solutions for addressing this problem. Chandra et
al. [1] [8] introduce the way of using failure detectors to solve consensus and provide the
requirements for implementing such failure detectors. Those requirements are known as
property completeness and the property of accuracy. However, the study focuses on
solving the consensus in which the majority of processes are not failed, but it also
discloses the requirement for different scenarios; for instance, the majority of processes
are faulty. The study reveals that to address different levels of consensus problems, a set
of various failure detectors is required. By combining different level of completeness and
accuracy, they introduce a hierarchy of failure detectors, Fig. 3. Moreover, they prove the
Fig. 3: The hierarchy of failure detectors from [1]
failure detectors are reducible by using the proposed algorithm. For example, in the study,
it is proved that with the given algorithm, a weak failure detector acquired with weak
completeness and weak accuracy is reducible to a strong failure detector that is acquired
with strong completeness and weak accuracy. This fact further affects a later study to
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show that in the proposed hierarchy of the failure detectors, there exists a weakest failure
detector [9].
2.2.2 Failure detectors with consensus algorithms
The introduction of failure detectors renders another possibility to solve the consensus
problem. While many solutions are addressing the problem of f < n2 , such as Paxos, Raft,
and ZAB [15] [27] [14], and those algorithms do not cooperate with failure detectors,
there are also a few studies focusing on solving the consensus problem in two-node
systems, f ≤ n2 . In [28] and [29], the use of the failure detectors are similar to the origins
by presenting a list of suspected processes. The studies also provide how strong the
failure detectors should be to solve the consensus problem in a two-node system. In the
proposals, both studies demonstrate that a Strong failure detector and even an eventually
strong failure detector can solve such a problem. Yet, neither [28] nor [29] addresses the
problem of the possibility of transaction overwritten which is discussed with the property
of See. We consider that the problem of losing data happens in the multiple transitions of
leadership. Given that the proposed algorithms in both [28] and [29] do not explicitly
involve in the primary-backup paradigm, it is reasonable to consider that the property of
see is not necessary. With the former theoretical foundations, the acquisition of the Oracle
in Apache ZooKeeper improves two-node systems’ availability. The former studies
provide clues regarding the definition of the Oracle, but also disclose a possible
inconsistency in the system.
2.2.3 Failure detectors in practical
On the other hand, some debates exist on how strong the failure detectors need to be
to solve the problem and what failure detectors are implementable. Park believes that the
perfect failure detector is required to solve the consensus problem [4]. Compared to other
works, the study treats the fact that the election problem differs from the consensus
problem. Garg et al. believe the weakest failure detectors is not weak enough to be
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implemented in practice [6]. Instead, they introduce another kind of failure detectors
which is acquired a weaker accuracy guarantee so that they are implementable in practice.
Although the weakest failure detectors cannot be used to solve the consensus problem as
expected, they are suitable for other applications similar to our two-node system. In
Fetzer’s work, the study introduces a hardware-based perfect failure detector called
watchdog. Watchdog does not make mistakes in suspecting correct processes faulty
because it makes processes faulty proactively before reporting the failure [7].
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3 USING ORACLE TO SOLVE ZOOKEEPER ON TWO-REPLICA PROBLEM
In this section, the proposed method is introduced. This section is structured in four
subsections as the following. In Section 3.1, the project defines our system models, ZAB,
and the Oracle. In section 3.2, the project explains how each process communicates in
different phases of ZAB and introduces the properties of ZAB that our proposed method
will still maintain. In section 3.3, the project not only demonstrates how the Oracle
participates in different phases of ZAB to maintain the liveness while one of the two
processes fails, but also discloses the issue of transaction overwritten which is not
discussed in previous two-node consensus algorithms. In section 3.4, the project discusses
the proposed approach in three fundamental questions, Liveness, Termination, and
Consistency. The project shows that the property of strong completeness provides the
Liveness and Termination while the property of mutual exclusion eliminates the case of
split-brain.
3.1 Asynchronous distributed system model
The system model is a hybrid of the one proposed by Chandra et al. in [1], [8],
and [9] and the one proposed by Junqueira et al. in [26]. A formal definition of the failure
detectors is from [1] and [8]. An asynchronous distributed system, generally, is a system
in which the system’s processes communicate with each other by sending messages, and
the time for sending messages is finite but unbounded.
3.1.1 Asynchronous distributed system with crash failures
We have an asynchronous distributed system consisting of two processes p1 and p2,
and they have dedicated reliable failure detectors o1 and o2, Fig 4. Processes
communicate with each other using ZAB [26], and the transmission delay is unbounded.
The failure detectors, noted as Ω = {0,1}, guarantee the following statements informally:
• Completeness If p j fails, oi eventually indicates the failure, and vice versa.
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Fig. 4: System model
• Accuracy oi may indicate p j fails incorrectly for infinite times, and vice versa.
• Mutual Exclusion For oi and o j, oi = 1 and o j = 1 is impossible at any given time.
• See oi see a transaction, τ , if oi participates in τ .
The two processes communicate with each other in iterations and follow the atomic
broadcast protocol, ZAB, according to [26] and [14]. The processes can crash and recover
an infinite number of times. We define a process is up if it is not crash and down
otherwise. In the case that a process is recovering, we say the process is up. The
processes which satisfy the described properties are ∏. A quorum Q is formed by up
processes ∈∏, in which the processes are capable to communicate with each other in
only ZAB. For maintaining progress, the system needs to satisfy either one of the two
following statements. We consider the system to maintain progress if:
• there are two up processes for a sufficient amount of time to form a quorum Q.
• there is at least one process pi is up and oi = 1 where pi ∈∏ and oi ∈Ω.
However, for any two Q and Q′, there exists at least a process pi ∈∏ where pi ∈ Q and
pi ∈ Q′.
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3.1.2 ZooKeeper atomic broadcast protocol, ZAB
In the system model, each process communicates with the other by sending messages
in iterations. According to [12], it is known that the order of the event is one of the
critical factors to solve the consensus problem. ZAB is theoretically proven to provide
sufficient properties for asynchronous distributed systems and to be a practical atomic
broadcast protocol used by modem applications [10] [30] [31]. The core of ZAB is a
variant of the famous quorum-based consensus algorithm, Paxos, introduced by
Lamport [15]. The majority of the correct processes ensure the Liveness( we use Liveness
and Progress interchangeably) and the Safety ( we use Safety, Consistency, and
Agreement interchangeably) of the system. ZooKeeper uses ZAB to maintain the core
properties, including the guarantee of the total ordering of events and uses the
primary-back paradigm [22] to lead the cluster and serve the clients [26].
ZAB uses the primary-back paradigm to execute requests and propagate the states of
the system. It is necessary to clearly state the relation between primary processes and how
iterations work in the system. According to [26], the following statements exist.
According to the primary-backup paradigm, it is clear that, at any given time, there
exists at most a primary process ρn which leads the cluster as the n-th primary process
where ρn ∈∏. Therefore, we can have an unbounded sequence to present the primary
processes’ history as ρ1ρ2ρ3...ρnρn+1 where ρn ∈∏. With this sequence, we say that a
primary process ρn is an earlier primary process of ρn′, ρn ≺ ρn′, if n < n′. Due to the
recoverability of ρn ∈∏, ρn and ρn′ may be the same process.
We consider that the iteration that causes a change in the system’s state is a transaction
τ = 〈v,z〉 as 〈value,zxid(transaction identifier)〉. z contains two facts of the system. The
first one is the current epoch of the system presented by epoch(z), and the other one is the
counter value of z presented by counter(z). While the value of epoch(z) is incremented
upon the change of the primary process, the value of counter(z) is incremented upon the
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creation of a new transaction. With these two facts, we can define the relations between
transactions. We say a transaction τ = 〈v,z〉 precedes τ ′= 〈v′,z′〉, τ ≺ τ ′, if
• epoch(z)< epoch(z′), or
• epoch(z) = epoch(z′) and counter(z)< counter(z′)
Also, τ  τ ′ is either τ ≺ τ ′ or τ = τ ′
Nevertheless, ZAB is a protocol for communicating. We consider to have a reliable
transmission median, the channel, which satisfies the following properties as stated
in [26]:
• Integrity For any two processes pi, p j ∈∏, pi receives a message m if and only if
p j has sent m.
• Prefix For any two processes pi, p j ∈∏, if pi receives message m′ at iteration z and
message m′ at iteration z′ where z′< z, then p j receives m′ before m.
• Single iteration The channel oi j used by pi, p j ∈∏ only contains messages for at
most a single iteration.
One can think of TCP as a possible transmission median that satisfies these properties.
Given the aforementioned facts, in our system model, ZAB is adapted as our basic
algorithm when the processes communicate with each other, and is applied with a failure
detector to solve the proposed consensus problem with proves.
3.1.3 Unreliable failure detector, the Oracle
In [1], Chandra et al. define two major properties of a failure detector. Completeness
property limits what kinds of mistakes that a failure detector can make while Accuracy
property limits the number of times that a failure detector can occur. Informally, the
properties are defined as the following:
• Weak Completeness: Eventually, every process that crashes is permanently
suspected by some correct processes.
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• Eventual Weak Accuracy: There is a time after which some correct processes are
never suspected by any processes.
Additionally, a failure detector, F , which satisfies the aforementioned properties, has been
proved as the weakest failure detector to solve the consensus problem with a reliable
broadcast protocol in [9].
However, in the asynchronous distributed system defined in [9], it is proved that such
a failure detector can only solve the consensus problem where f < n2 . We say f is the
maximum failure that can occur at the time and n is the number of total processes in the
system. In our system, n = 2. In order to solve the consensus problem where f ≤ n2 in the
same system model, the failure detector must be stronger than F . Therefore, we consider
a kind of failure detector stronger than F and follows the following desired properties
from [9].
• Strong Completeness: Eventually, every process that crashes is permanently
suspected by every correct processes.
• Eventual Weak Accuracy: Eventually, some correct processes are never
suspected by any processes.
In [32], this kind of failure detectors has been proved that it is capable of solving the
consensus problem where f ≤ n2 . In the case of f ≤
n
2 , it also means in the system model
which we present, the consensus problem can be solved when either p1 or p2 fails.
According to [1], [8], [9], and [32], all of the mentioned failure detectors always
present a list of suspected faulty processes. We consider the failure detector to present in
another way, which only contains Boolean values. The failure detector’s expected
outcome is to provide the information to maintain the system’s Liveness without losing
Safety. The basis of the problem in asynchronous distributed systems is the hardness of
distinguishing a process is faulty or is running slowly.
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Fig. 5: Strong completeness, On-time
Fig. 6: Strong completeness, Eventually
Fig. 7: Eventual Weak Accuracy
To maintain Safety, avoiding lost transaction, we consider the failure detector can see
the latest transaction τ in the light of the concept of witness in [24]. We say a failure
detector see τ if the failure detector participates in creating τ . Thus, when the system, the
leader process ρi, creates a transaction τ where oi = 1, the Oracle sees τ . With the ability
to see, the Oracle can only authorize a later τ ′ where τ ≺ τ ′ if it sees τ .
Conclusively, we consider the failure detectors to provide the authorizations of
whether the owner process can proceed without waiting for faulty processes identified by
the failure detectors to the response. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the property of strong
completeness and accuracy. Note that the nature of distributed systems is every process
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runs at a different speed, although the figures seem to be synchronous. We do not consider
p1, p2, o1, and o2 are always synchronous.
We denote this kind of failure detector as Ω.
3.2 Problem Statement
ZooKeeper atomic broadcast protocol provides the desired properties of Apache
ZooKeeper [26]. These properties have been proven that the consensus problem where
f < n2 is solvable. We consider that after the introduction of Ω, ZAB is capable of
providing the same desired properties of Apache ZooKeeper to solve the consensus
problem where f ≤ n2 . That is the system of p1 and p2 can maintain the progress when
either one process fails.
3.2.1 Review on ZAB
In this section, we refer to the algorithm of ZAB protocol in [26]. In ZAB, there are
three phases of states. They are discovery, synchronization, and broadcast. In every
state, the behaviors of each process differ from each other based on the role of the process.
They are leaders, followers, and observers. A leader process is a primary process in the
primary-backup paradigm, and we denote a leader process as l ∈∏. A follower process is
a process that is not a primary process, and we denote a follower process as f ∈∏. An
observer process is a special follower process that does not participate in the process of
decision. We consider covering the behaviors of l and f in different phases, given that Ω
does not interact with observers.
In the discovery phase, Fig. 8, l shall receive CEPOCH(e) from a quorum Q so that it
could establish a new epoch e′, and asking ACKs from Q by sending NEWEPOCH(e′). A
potential l finishes the first phase when it receives the sufficient ACKs from Q, and then
moves to the second phase, the synchronization phase.
In the synchronization phase, Fig. 9, the primary goal is to ensure the consistency in
the system. The discovery phase makes the followers recognize that there is a leader in
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Fig. 8: Discovery phase
Fig. 9: Synchronization phase
the system. l proposes NEWLEADER(e′, He′) which contains the new epoch e′ and a
history of transactions He′ to every process in Q. During these communications, the
followers communicate with l to determine the best actions to synchronize the data; for
examples, overwriting the whole data and concatenating missing parts of data. Upon
receiving enough ACKs from Q, l is able to lead the cluster. It means the followers now
have the same data as l.
In the broadcast phase, Fig. 10, this is when the service starts to serve the clients. l
receives the requests which cause a change in the states, e.g., a write request, either from
the client directly or from other f . Upon receiving a request, l creates a proposal
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Fig. 10: Broadcast phase
〈e′,〈v,z〉〉 where epoch(z) = e′, and proposes it to Q. Q commits a proposal when it
receives enough ACKs from Q.
In our case, there are only two processes. It turns out that l must receive the ACK
from the other process which must be f to maintain the progress in any phases. It is
obvious that any failure which occurs in the system stalls the progress. To address the
issue, we introduce the Oracle to have the system maintain the progress without losing
any guarantees.
3.2.2 Properties of ZAB
The following summarizes the desired properties of Apache ZooKeeper, which are
maintained by ZAB in [26]. There are two transactions τ = 〈v,z〉 and τ ′= 〈v′,z′〉.
For satisfying the safety, three properties are described:
• Integrity If some process delivers τ , there exists some process pi ∈∏ has broadcast
τ .
• Total order If some process delivers τ before τ ′ where τ ≺ τ ′, then any process
which delivers τ ′ must has delivered τ before delivering τ ′.
• Agreement If some process pi delivers τ and some process p j delivers τ ′, then
either pi delivers τ ′ or p j delivers τ .
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These three properties ensure the order of messages. According to the state machines,
we know that a process in a state S executes a command C which changes its state from S
to S′. In order to achieve S′ by executing C, the process must be in S before executing C.
As every process receives and applies the transactions to the states in the same order, they
are deterministic. Nevertheless, these properties are not strong enough to ensure the
determinism of the system when the primary processes changes in the run time. Therefore,
ZAB needs one more property to ensure there is no missed transactions even if a change
in primary processes happens; otherwise, the processes are not deterministic. The
guarantee of this property also implies that when a skipped transaction causes the
inconsistency, then all dependent states based on the skipped transaction shall also be
skipped. In [26], this property is called primary older which is considered as two parts as
the following:
• Local primary order If a primary process broadcasts τ before it broadcasts τ ′, then
a process that delivers τ ′ must also deliver τ before τ ′, where τ ≺ τ ′.
• Global primary order Let τ and τ ′ satisfy the following: Considering two primary
process ρi and ρ j in which ρi ≺ ρ j,
– ρi broadcast τ , and
– ρ j broadcast τ ′.
If a process pi ∈∏ delivers both τ and τ ′, then pi must deliver τ before τ ′.
Because of the primary-backup paradigm, the primary process needs to ensure the
changes in the states are consistent with other followed processes. Therefore, a primary
process shall begin broadcasting in a newly established epoch after delivering the
transactions left from the previous epoch. The property to make a primary process capable
is primary integrity. We believe this property becomes more significant after the
introduction of Ω.
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• Primary integrity If a primary process ρ broadcasts τ and some other process
delivers τ ′ such that τ ′ has broadcast by a predecessor primary process ρ ′ where
τ ′ ≺ τ given that ρ ′ ≺ ρ , then ρ must deliver τ ′ before broadcast τ .
When this property is not maintained, the system is expected to lose its liveness.
3.3 Solving consensus with the Oracle as a failure detector
The idea of using oracle to solve consensus is simple. Using the authorization from
the Oracle to override the decision from the quorums is the fundamental idea of the
proposed method. In this section, we show how the Oracle is introduced to different
phases of ZAB, and solves the consensus problem.
3.3.1 Leader election
The current version of the leader election algorithm which is a variant of Paxos, in
Apache ZooKeeper relies on the decision of Q. That is to have a potential leader, a
process needs to collect the majority of votes from Q. Once a potential leader is generated
by the algorithm, the assemble moves to the discovery phase. The algorithm is described
below in the perspective of pi, Fig. 11.
• Step 1. p1 sends a ballot including zxid to p2 which proposes p1 is the leader.
• Step 2. When p1 receives a ballot from p2, it adds the received ballot to the vote set.
• Step 3. p1 updates its ballot in the vote set if there is another more suitable candidate
in the received ballots based on zxid.
• Step 4. When there is a majority in the vote set, a potential leader is generated. p1
starts its discovery phase as the potential leader. Otherwise, back to Step 1. It is
obvious that Step 4. cannot succeed when a failure happens in the system. The
Oracle takes place in Step 4. to address the failure cases, Fig. 12.
• Step 4o. In either of the two following cases, p1 starts its discovery phase as the
potential leader. Otherwise, back to Step 1.
– When there is a majority in the vote set, a potential leader is generated.
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Fig. 11: Leader election
– When o1 = 1, p1 is the potential leader.
Fig. 12: Leader election with the Oracle
Note that to avoid the split-brain issues, the mutual exclusion of o1 and o2 is
important. A split brain occurs when o1 = 1 and o2 = 1, which violets the property of Ω.
3.3.2 Discovery phase
The leader election algorithm only guarantees to generate a single the most potential
leader. In the discovery phase, upon the recognition from Q, a potential leader becomes a
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legal leader. Without assistant from the Oracle, a follower failure results in the system
losing its liveness. Similarly, the Oracle can provide the permission which makes a
potential leader become a legal leader, Fig. 13.
Fig. 13: Discovery phase the Oracle
3.3.3 Synchronization phase
In our two processes system, the failure of the only follower means l does not need to
go over this phase. The system loses its liveness because l cannot ensure that the system
is consistent with every process. In this case, the Oracle can authorize l, indicating that
the consistency is ensured, Fig. 14.
Fig. 14: Synchronization phase the Oracle
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3.3.4 Broadcast phase
In the system, l receives request either from the clients directly or from other
followers. Once the request is received by l, l creates a proposal, Propose(z), and
broadcasts it in Q. Ideally, the followers reply ACKs, Ack(z), based on the total order. l
can commit the proposal once it has the majority of ACKs from Q. However, the majority
is never achieved in our two processes system when the only follower fails. In this case,
the Oracle can authorize l, indicating that l can move system forward. Thus, even though
the majority is not maintained, the proposal can be committed, Fig. 15.
Fig. 15: Broadcast phase the Oracle
3.3.5 Revalidation on outstanding proposals
Outstanding proposals are blocking the progress because of the validation mechanism.
We consider the outstanding proposals are the proposals which are broadcast in the
quorum, but they are not yet to be committed due to insufficient ACKs. In Fig. 15,
proposal(z) is actually an outstanding proposal. After it is proposed by l, the only
follower fails and could not reply with an ACK. In the current implementation of Apache
ZooKeeper, every proposal is processed in a pipeline manner for the sake of the efficiency.
l validates a proposal to be committed once it receives an ACK from the quorum
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including the ACK from itself. The validation is event-driven. In other words, if there is
no ACK arrives at l, there is no validation either. l performs two validations when it
receives ACKs after the introduction of the Oracle. One is to validate whether the number
of received ACKs satisfies the majority, and the other is to query the Oracle for the
permission. However, the progress still cannot maintained, even though the Oracle
authorizes to form the quorum. The reasons for blocking the progress are Strong
Completeness of the Oracle and Primary integrity of ZAB.
Strong Completeness allow the Oracle not to response a failure immediately after a
failure takes place. This property results in that l cannot pass the validation when it
receives the ACK from itself, given that neither the received ACKs are insufficient or the
Oracle does not authorize. Because the validation process is event-driven, after the only
follower fails, l will not receive another ACK or another validation process takes places.
Consequently, the outstanding proposals are never committed although the Oracle
responses to the failure eventually. These never-committed outstanding proposals block
the progress due to Primary integrity. The idea of Primary integrity is simple, ZAB
cannot allow a missed transaction in the system because the missed transaction could
eventually lead to an inconsistency. Thus, we states that a proposal(z) is proposed, but it
is not committed. Even though a later proposal(z′) satisfies the conditions to be
committed, proposal(z′) is still blocked.
A practical fix for this issue is the revalidation. l needs to eventually check the
outstanding proposals in arbitrary ways during the run-time. The Oracle can authorize l to
commit the outstanding proposals when the majority is never achieved. Thus, the system
can maintain the progress without violating Primary integrity.
3.3.6 Property of See
The property of See ensures that there will not be a data loss when multiple leader
transitions takes places with different processes and oracles. Fig. 16 shows a typical
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Fig. 16: The loss of data happens on transaction 0x01.
example of data loss which apparently breaks the safety when the Oracle does not have
the property of See. Initially, p1 receives the leadership and start the service. After an
arbitrary period of time, p2 fails and o1 detects the failure, indicating the failure within the
guarantees. p1 queries o1 for committing the outstanding proposal, transaction 0x01, given
that a revalidation process exists. o1 authorizes the query as a result of the proper reaction
from the failure of p2. p1 is able to maintain the progress and commit other transactions
later on, transaction 0x02. At a moment, p1 fails unexpectedly. This failure also makes
the service unavailable because there does not exist an up process. p2 recovers back from
the previous failure. Since p1 failed, p2 receives this information from o2, and becomes
the new leader as a result. The service is maintained and p2 is able to make system
forward. p2 queries the authorization for transaction 0x01. o2 authorizes the query, and p2
commit it. Thus, a duplicated transaction is made with 0x01. It not only causes the loss of
the original data, but also makes processes decide differently on the same transaction.
To avoid this case from happening, the design shall limit the behavior of the Oracle.
The property of See requires the Oracle to be aware of the most up-to-date transaction.
Recall that the Oracle can see a transaction if it participates in the transaction. Thus, o1
should record that transaction 0x01 is authorized after p1 queries for the authorization
because o1 participates in transaction 0x01. Also, o2 shall be aware of that the most
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up-to-date transaction is 0x01. Given the above facts, after p2 recovers back from the
failure, p2 shall not become the leader because it does not have the most up-to-date
information. Apparently, the progress is not maintained.
3.4 Analysis
In this section, we address three fundamental questions of the consensus problem. We
first show how the Oracle improves the Liveness of Apache ZooKeeper when the quorum
is not maintainable. Also, we show the algorithm itself does not lose its Termination after
introducing the Oracle. Lastly, we demonstrate that the Oracle requires both the property
of mutual exclusion and the property of see to maintain the Consistency.
3.4.1 Liveness
Section 3.1.2 states that the system relies on the majority of up processes to form a
quorum and maintain the Liveness. However, in a two-node system, even a single failure
is not tolerable. For tolerating that single failure, the Oracle is introduced. In order to
show how the Oracle improves the Liveness of Apache ZooKeeper, two perspectives need
to be taken into account, the leader’s perspective, and the follower’s perspective.
Fig. 17 shows the steps for a leader to maintain its leadership when the only follower
process becomes faulty and cannot maintain the quorum. Once the follower process does
not respond to a heartbeat within the timeout, the follower gets dropped from the quorum.
As a result, the leader process knows the quorum is not maintainable. Initially, the leader
process abandons its leadership and start another round of the leader election. It may
seem that the leader election will never end due to the insufficient up processes, which is
the loss of the Liveness. With the introduction of the Oracle, the leader process has a
chance to query the Oracle to maintain its leadership after the failure of the quorum is
known. However, due to the strong accuracy, the Oracle does not guarantee that the faulty
process can be detected within the predefined timeout. If the Oracle does not respond on
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Fig. 17: Using Oracle to maintain the Liveness, Leader Case
time, the leader process abandons its leadership and starts the leader election algorithm to
obtain the leadership again, Fig. 12.
On the other hand, the follower case is straight-forward. The remaining process
simply starts the leader election as expected and later obtains the leadership through
authorization from the Oracle.
The three cases above reveal a common question on the strong accuracy that why we
do not need the Oracle to respond immediately. Every faulty process can recover, but the
time for the recovery is not defined. The Oracle can detect the faulty process within a
period of time. We argue that the comparison between the recovery time and the detection
time is meaningless. The discussion shall involve with the uncertainty and certainty. With
the Oracle, the two-node system can maintain its Liveness even when there is only a
single up process. The reason behind this fact is that the Oracle can detect the faulty
process eventually. On the other hand, without the Oracle, the two-node system cannot
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maintain its Liveness when there is only an up process. The system needs to halt for an
indefinite period of time until the faulty process is recovered. The ”Eventually” of the
strong accuracy is a certainty, while the recovery of a faulty process is an uncertainty.
Therefore, we consider that the Oracle needs to satisfy the strong accuracy at least to
maintain the Liveness.
3.4.2 Termination
We will show that the Termination is still maintained from two perspectives, the
original ZAB protocol and the Oracle. After the introduction of the Oracle, the ZAB
protocol itself is not changed when the majority of the processes are up. In section 3.3, it
is apparent that the Oracle is a secondary validation. It is only used when the quorum is
not maintainable. Thus, in the usual context, ZAB maintains the Termination even after
the introduction of the Oracle. When the Oracle participates in the protocol, the
Termination is still maintained. We already show how the Oracle maintains the Liveness
when the only follower becomes faulty. We also explain why the Oracle must at least
satisfy the strong accuracy, which makes the Oracle eventually indicate the faulty process.
The strong accuracy implies that the algorithm eventually decides. As a result, the
Termination is maintained.
3.4.3 Consistency
One of the critical requirements in distributed systems is the fact that gives any two
processes; they will not decide differently on the same transaction. Regardless of the
original Paxos algorithm or ZAB, the Consistency is ensured by both the quorums and the
intersected process. However, in a two-node system, things become different. Losing one
node in such a system fails the quorum. In order to maintain the Consistency, the system
drops the Liveness instead, which is a typical trade-off. In the previous section, we
demonstrate how the introduction of the Oracle makes this trade-off unnecessary. Here we
introduce two possible issues with the Oracle, the split-brain issue and the transaction
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Fig. 18: A Violation of Mutual exclusion, Split-Brain
overwritten issue. They are both addressed by the property of mutual exclusion and
the property of See respectively.
We use the property of mutual exclusion to avoid the split-brain issue. This property
prevents the leader election algorithm generates two leaders. Fig. 12 shows how a process
becomes a leader under the Oracle’s authorization. The example reveals the robustness
and strong dependency of the Oracle to elect a leader. As long as the Oracle authorizes, a
process can become a leader even without the quorum’s support at all. The strong
completeness only guarantees that a failure process can be detected, but the eventual weak
accuracy allows the Oracle to make mistakes on correct processes infinitely. Thus, these
two facts are not powerful enough to restrict the Oracle’s behavior and prevent the
split-brain issue. Recall the definition of the Oracle that:
• Mutual Exclusion For oi and o j, oi = 1 and o j = 1 is impossible at any given time.
Fig. 18 is an example of the violation of the mutual exclusion. Given that the eventual
weak accuracy allows mistakes on correct processes, o1 and o2 are possible to make
mistakes simultaneously. The strong dependency of the Oracle is another factor to cause
this unexpected result. Needless to say, the existence of two leaders within a system
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eventually breaks the Consistency. As a result, the property of mutual exclusion is
desirable and needed. The system does not concern which process becomes the leader
eventually. It concerns there is a leader, and it must be the only one. Although another
possible way to solve the split-brain issue is to enhance the eventual weak accuracy to a
stronger guarantee, this approach reduces the flexibility of the Oracle’s implementation.
In previous section 3.3, it demonstrates an example of transaction overwritten
because of the Oracle is not aware of the latest transaction even though the three
properties are maintained. It emphasizes that although o1 and o2 are independently
serving their distinct processes as representatives of the Oracle, o1 and o2 need to have a
way to recognize the up-to-date transaction and share such information.
37
4 DEPLOYMENT EXAMPLES
One should consider that the failure detector’s outcome is to authorize the querying
ZooKeeper instance whether it has the right to move the system forward without waiting
for the faulty instance, which is identified by the failure detector.
4.1 An Implementation of hardware
Suppose two dedicated pieces of hardware, HW1 and HW2, can host ZooKeeper
instances, ZK1 and ZK2, respectively, and form a cluster. A hardware device is attached to
both of the hardware, and it is capable of determining whether the hardware is power on
or not. So, when HW1 is not power on, the ZK1 is undoubtedly faulty. Therefore, the
hardware device updates the Oracle file on HW2 to 1, which indicates that ZK1 is faulty
and authorizes ZK2 to move the system forwards.
4.2 An Implementation of software
Suppose two dedicated pieces of hardware, HW1 and HW2, can host ZooKeeper
instances, ZK1 and ZK2, respectively, and form a cluster. One can have two more services,
o1 and o2, on HW1 and HW2, respectively. The job of o1 and o2 are detecting the other
hardware is alive or not. For example, o1 can constantly ping HW2 to determine if HW2 is
power on or not. When o1 cannot ping HW2, o1 identifies that HW2 is faulty and then
update the Oracle file of ZK1 to 1, which indicates that ZK2 is faulty and authorizes ZK1
to move the system forwards.
4.3 Use USB devices as the Oracle to maintain progress
In macOS,10.15.7 (19H2), the external storage devices are mounted under
/Volumes. Thus, we can insert a USB device which contains the required information
as the Oracle. When the device is connected, the Oracle authorizes the leader to move
system forward, which also means the other instance fails. There are SIX steps to
reproduce this stimulation.
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1) Firstly, insert a USB device named Oracle, and then we can expect that
/Volumes/Oracle is accessible.
2) Secondly, we create a file contains 1 under /Volumes/Oracle named
mastership. Now we can access /Volumes/Oracle/mastership, and so
does the zookeeper instances to see whether it has the right to move the system
forward. The file can easily be generated by the following command:
$echo 1 > mastership















(NOTE) The split brain issues will not occur because there is only a SINGLE USB
device in this stimulation. Thus, the guarantee of mutual exclusion Additionally,
mastership should not be shared by multiple instances.
4) Fourthly, start the cluster, and it is expected it forms a quorum normally.
5) Fifthly, terminate the instance either without attaching to a USB device or
mastership contains 0. There are two scenarios to expect:
a) A leader failure occurs, and the remained instance finishes the leader election on
its own due to the Oracle.
b) The quorum is still maintained due to the Oracle.
6) Lastly, when the USB device is removed, /Volumes/Oracle/mastership
becomes unavailable. Therefore, according to the current implementation, whenever
the Leader queries the Oracle, the Oracle throws an exception and return FALSE.
Repeat the fifth step, and then it is expected that either the system cannot recover
from a leader failure ,or the leader loses the quorum. In either case, the service is
interrupted.
With these steps, we can show and practice how the Oracle works with two-instance
systems with ease.
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Fig. 19: The result of Evaluation. Time is measured by Apache ZooKeeper clients
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Overview
The implementation of the proposed method is tested on a product of Juniper
Networks Inc. As Apache ZooKeeper is one of the critical services within the operating
system that the product uses, the failure of ZooKeeper inevitably brings a service
interruption to the product. Recall that the deployment context mentioned in section 1 and
Fig. 1. two identical computing resources, p1 and p2, are set in the same chassis. There is
a dedicated hardware device working as the Oracle, Ω, in the chassis. The representatives,
o1 and o2, serves p1 and p2 respectively.
The primary goal of this implementation is to improve service availability by reducing
system downtime. The evaluation is proceeded by stimulating possible failure cases with
internal commands and using Apache ZooKeeper clients to evaluate system downtime.
The Fig. 19 shows the recovering time and the improvements in different cases. There
are twelve cases in total, separated by two types, PL and PF. While PL means the
primary computing resource is the leader process in Apache ZooKeeper, PF means the
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primary computing resource is the follower process in Apache ZooKeeper. Besides the
two types of cases, the combinations of leader failures and follower failures with different
stop-over failures are also taken into account.
5.2 Variables
However, in this evaluation, three variables deserve our attention.
1) TO, the timeout, affects the system downtime significantly by referring to No.1 and
No.3. This is the predefined timeout that is configured by the users when setting up
the Apache ZooKeeper cluster. The shorter the timeout is, the shorter the system
downtime time will be. This timeout halts both the leader process and the follower
process to wait for each other if necessary. For instance, they wait for the
transmission delay.
2) SNAP, the snapshot time, also halts the system for a short period by referring to
No.2 and No.8. As the transactions go through the leader process, although most of
the data are in-memory processed, Apache ZooKeeper outputs those data to the disk
in batches.
3) P SWIT, the primary switch time, affects the system downtime. This variable has a
strong relation with Strong Completeness of the Oracle. Recall that in section 3.4,
we discuss how the Eventually relates to Liveness. P SWIT is the time to detect
the failure and authorize the remained process to maintain the liveness.
Removing those known variables in this evaluation, presented in column Adj. (ms), it
is apparent that there is at least 40 percent of improvement in the system downtime in
most cases and an average 85 percent of improvements among all of the cases.
5.3 The Oracle makes mistakes
The evaluation experiment covers the case that the Oracle makes mistake infinitely as
the dedicated hardware devices indicates which the primary computing resource is. For
42
example, when p1 is the primary process and the leader process, o1 is always 1, which
means p2 is faulty, No.2 and No.6. However, this does not cause any issues because the
Oracle still maintains the property of mutual exclusion and the property of Eventual
Weak Accuracy allows this to happen. Instead of causing issues, it also eliminates the
time for P SWIT, which benefits the system.
During the evaluation, there is a rare variable, BL, in No.5 and No.11. BL means the
Oracle did not authorize the remaining process to maintain liveness. These cases only
restart Apache ZooKeeper within the operating system. Due to the strong completeness,
we require the Oracle to detect the failure certainly if there is any instead of immediately.
However, the restart of Apache ZooKeeper within the operating system is fast, and is
expected to recover in a short time. In other words, the experimental case which
introduces BL is under management, and is a certainty. Eventually, the Oracle will still
detect the failure and resume the service when the recovery is not expected.
5.4 The switch of the primary resource leads to split-brain
This evaluation shows the possibility of split-brain issue even though the property of
mutual exclusion is introduced and not violated, Fig. 20. In this work, we assume a
boundary on the switch time and frequency of switching of the Oracle. Specifically, there
is no time interval where an Oracle switches back and forth between two resources such
that:
• one process validates that it is the primary process; then,
• a second process validates that it is the primary resource, followed by the first
process validating again that it is the leader.
This boundary prevents the oracle from enabling two processes to act as a leader at the
same time. In previous sections, we have demonstrated how a process goes through a
series of phases and becomes a leader process. It is possible that during each phase, the
Oracle makes a mistake for a very short period and does not violate the proposed
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Fig. 20: The switch of the primary resource leads to split-brain
properties when a process queries for its authorization. The eventual weak accuracy
only allows the Oracle to make mistakes, but it does not regulate the time between any
two mistakes. We recognize this case is rare but possible to happen.
5.5 The coordination between hardware and software
In the previous section, we argue the liveness from a perspective of uncertainty and
certainty. We recognize that practically the improper coordination between the
user-defined timeout that Apache ZooKeeper uses and the detection time results in the
system’s inefficiency. Failed to detect the faulty process immediately produces more
procedures to maintain the service. For example, the remaining process needs to go
through the leader election again even though it had been the leader when its only
follower went away. The evaluation result also shows that the improvement is still
significant, although there is an inefficient period of waiting for the Oracle. A further
improvement could be conducted by gathering the statics of the detection time of the
Oracle and other timely factors. A proper user-defined timeout can be determined by
referring to that statics information, and the coordination between Apache ZooKeeper and
the Oracle can be improved.
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6 FUTURE WORK
A possible proposal to continue this project is to introduce user preference on the
leader process in Apache ZooKeeper by extending the idea of the Oracle. In the previous
section, we reveals when the primary computing resource, p1, is the leader process, the
system can recover faster because o1 is always 1. Also, we notice that there is a different
in the downtime by comparing No.2 and No.8 in Fig. 19. When the primary computing
resource is the follower process, an additional time is needed to perform a new round of
the leader election besides the snapshot time. Thus, to minimize system downtime, the
system shall choose the primary computing resource as the leader process at the
beginning of the service.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
In this research, we show that the introduction of the Oracle, a failure detector,
complements the availability of Apache ZooKeeper in two-node systems. We first review
the essential protocol, ZooKeeper Atomic Broadcast protocol, and briefly reveal the
properties which it maintains. Later, we demonstrate the proposed ways to integrate the
Oracle into the protocol and revise the current leader election algorithm.
We show that the two-node systems are fault-tolerant by using the Oracle. However,
the issues of the split-brain and the transaction overwritten deserve our attention. To
avoid these issues, we disclose the four properties of the Oracle. For the sake of
preserving the flexibility on the implementation, we introduce the eventual weak
accuracy and the mutual exclusion to the Oracle. We allow the Oracle to make
unlimited mistakes on incorrectly indicating a correct process is faulty as long as it
maintains its mutual exclusion. However, when it comes to the Liveness, we ask the
Oracle to detect the faulty process correctly eventually; thus, the strong completeness.
Unlike the previous researches, we reveal the issue of the transaction overwritten.
Using the property of See, we limit the Oracle’s behavior to avoid authorizing an
outdated process as a new leader process.
With our proposed methods, the Oracle does not need to be a perfect failure detector
to solve the consensus problem. We firstly treat the Oracle as a dedicated hardware device
that is attached to two independent computing nodes. Instead of making the Oracle a
perfect failure detector, which is hard, we provide two alternative properties to enhance it
while achieving our goals and solving the consensus problem.
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